ACCOUNT OF THE 1815 CAMPAIGN, KNOWN AS WATERLOO
TO SERVE AS A HISTORICAL RECORD OF MARÉCHAL NEY
BY COLONEL HEYMÈS, his first aide-de-camp, eyewitness

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A general who takes command of an army on the eve of a battle is in a precarious position: everything is against him.

The author of the account that follows, a former soldier retired from service since the Battle of Waterloo, was far from believing that he would one day be forced to take up his pen to recount the last feats of arms in which he participated; but several writers described this 1815 campaign based on poor, or rather, false information. They attacked Marshal Ney's conduct to varying degrees; one of them even presented himself in the arena with a kind of official air that impressed everyone; hence the errors into which some of those who wrote on this subject fell, and who undoubtedly were not capable of seeking the truth.

They copied each other, and the falsehood became entrenched. And one of the greatest captains of our time was tried and condemned without a hearing, based on reports that can at least be suspected of being inaccurate.

It is to restore the truth in all its clarity that this account has been undertaken; not a single word will be found here that is not rigorously accurate. The author hopes to achieve his stated goal: to convince honest people who have remained French, amidst the partisan spirit and cliques for whom any means seem legitimate in order to assert themselves and dominate.

Everything was being prepared in France in June 1815 for the campaign to begin. Army corps had been formed, the Emperor's commands issued; Marshal Net was in Paris, anxious to know whether or not he would be deployed. He awaited, along with all of agitated France, the results of the great struggle that was about to begin.

On June 11, at eleven o'clock in the evening, the Marshal, being at the Élysée-Bourbon where the Emperor's departure was being prepared, received orders to join the army; by midnight, he had returned home; he immediately made preparations for his journey.

On the 12th, at nine o'clock in the morning, after dispatching six horses and his war retinue, the Marshal boarded a carriage with Colonel Heymes, his first aide-de-camp; he departed in a post-chaise. Messrs. Dutono, secretary, and Rayot, steward of his household, followed in a carriage. The Marshal arrived in Laon at ten o'clock in the evening; the Emperor was asleep, and he did not see him.

On the 13th, the Marshal was sent to Avesnes; He arrived there in the morning, went straight to the Emperor, and dined with him.

On the 14th, all the post horses were used for the Emperor's service, and the Marshal was unable to obtain any. It was only at ten o'clock in the morning that, having finally found some peasant horses, he was able to leave Avesnes. But the road was so bad, so heavily laden with troops, and the team carrying him so heavy, that he did not arrive in Beaumont until ten o'clock in the evening. The Emperor was asleep and he could not see him. The Marshal's quarters had not been prepared. Monsieur d'Aure, the army's intendant general, gave him a room where he spent the night.

On the 15th, the troops set out; the Emperor left Beaumont at two o'clock in the morning. The Marshal could not follow him, as he had no horses at his disposal. However, having learned around ten o'clock in the morning that Marshal Mortier had remained ill in the town, Ney went to see him and bought two horses from him. Colonel Heymes did the same, so that they were able to set off, followed by a servant; the carriages remained in Beaumont.

As the Marshal walked alongside the column, he was greeted by the flattering words of the old soldiers who rejoiced to see again in their midst the "redhead" (1) who had so often led them to victory.

(1) This was the name of trust and friendship that the old soldiers gave him among themselves.

At seven o'clock in the evening, the Marshal joined the Emperor beyond Charleroi, at the junction of the roads to Brussels and Fleurus.

"Good day, Ney," said the Emperor, "I am very glad to see you. You will take command of the first and second infantry corps; General Reille is marching with three divisions on Gosselies. General D'Erlon is to spend the night at Marchiennes-au-Pont; you will have with you the light cavalry division from Piraeus; I am also giving you the two regiments of chasseurs and lancers of my Guard, but do not use them. Tomorrow you will be joined by the heavy cavalry reserves under Kellermann. Go and push back the enemy."

The Marshal's wishes were fulfilled; He had a corps, but he forgot that there is nothing worse for a general than taking command of an army the day before a battle. He took leave of the Emperor, and an hour later he was at the head of the Second Corps; they marched, the skirmishers were engaged, and they passed Gosselies.

They soon took three or four prisoners from a battalion of Nassau's troops, which, along with the Hessians, Belgians, and others, formed the extreme left of the English army.

At ten o'clock in the evening, the Marshal occupied the village of Frasnes, located on the road to Brussels, a league before Quatre-Bras, with the Piraeus light cavalry division and the infantry division commanded by Bachelu. The two regiments of chasseurs and lancers of the Guard were in reserve behind the village. General Reille, with two infantry divisions and their artillery, remained at Gosselies where he spent the night. These divisions maintained communications while awaiting the arrival of the first corps, which was to spend the night at Archiennes-au-Pont.

Night had fallen, the troops had been marching since 2:00 a.m., and intelligence reported that ten battalions with artillery occupied Quatre-Bras, and that the British army was maneuvering to concentrate on this important point.

A position was taken up in front of Frasnes. The Marshal, after giving his orders and recommending the utmost vigilance, personally returned to Charleroi, where he did not arrive until midnight.

The Emperor had just returned; Ney supped and conferred with him from midnight until two in the morning.

The Marshal was reproached for not having seized the Quatre-Bras position on the 15th. That day, however, was quite eventful. In war, one can risk an attack, if one has a one in ten chance of success; but here, all the odds were against it. The troops were exhausted from a twenty-hour march. The Marshal knew neither the names of the generals nor those of the colonels. He did not know the strength of the regiments, and even less the number of men who had been able to keep up with the leading troops on such a long march. Would it have been wise to attempt a night attack with four or five thousand infantrymen and one thousand to twelve hundred cavalrymen on a point that no one knew and that was known to be defended by ten battalions with artillery? All soldiers of good faith would answer no. The Emperor himself judged it so, since he welcomed and invited the Marshal to supper at the end of that day, which was so important that one feels obliged to summarize the events that filled it.

We have seen that on the 15th, at ten o'clock in the morning, the Marshal, left behind for lack of transport, bought two horses; that at seven o'clock in the evening, he received a command; at eight o'clock he defeated the enemy and took prisoners; at ten o'clock he had advanced five leagues with his troops and was taking up position in front of Frasnes; at midnight, he reported back to Charleroi on the arrangements he had made. The Emperor invited him to supper, gave him his orders, and received the Marshal with the freedom of the camp. He shared with him his plans and hopes for the day of the 16th, which was about to begin. He shared a meal of friendship with him on the night of the 15th to the 16th. All the high-ranking officers of the Imperial headquarters could attest to this.

Where, then, is the proof of the Emperor's displeasure at the non-occupation of Quatre-Bras? He was too good a judge not to know that it could not have taken place.

On the 16th, at two o'clock in the morning, the Marshal returned to Gosselies where he stopped for a few moments to communicate with General Reille; he ordered him to leave as soon as possible, with his two divisions and his artillery, to rally at Frasnes, where the Marshal went almost immediately. There he found himself once again at the head of his troops and in the presence of the enemy. He gathered the information that the generals and other officers had been able to obtain. Meanwhile, Colonel Heymes toured the line, visiting each regiment. He noted down the names of the colonels and counted the strength of each corps. He soon afterward presented the situation report to the Marshal.

It can be seen that on the 16th, at eight o'clock in the morning, only General Pirée's light cavalry division, General Bachelu's infantry division, and the two regiments of chasseurs and lancers of the Guard, in reserve behind the village, remained at Frasnes; General Reille, with the two divisions commanded by Foy and Guilleminot, was on his way to rally at that point. General Girard's division had been directed the previous day by the Emperor towards Ligny, where the general was killed on the 16th. This division never rejoined the 2nd Corps, of which it was a part.

Thus, when the entire 2nd Corps was assembled, only four regiments of light cavalry, three infantry divisions, and the artillery were available, totaling 17,000 to 18,000 men, and not 40,000 as has been repeatedly claimed. This number did not include the light cavalry of the Guard; however, it should be remembered that the Emperor had forbidden its deployment.

The enemy, occupying Quatre-Bras, then displayed a force of 25,000 men with a substantial artillery force; its right flank covered the Bois de Bossu; its center was positioned at Quatre-Bras. its left flank was lost in the direction of Namur, whose road it occupied as it approached our right flank.

Lacking staff officers, which the Marshal desperately needed, officers from the Chasseurs and Lancers of the Guard were sent to meet the 1st Corps in the direction of Marchionnes-au-Point; they had orders to press its advance on Frasnes.

The morning of the 16th was spent reconnoitring the enemy and the terrain on which they were to fight, as well as awaiting the arrival of the 1st Corps and General Kellermann's cavalry reserves. Around eleven o'clock, General Flahaut brought the order to take Quatre-Bras and march on Brussels.

The Marshal immediately made his preparations. Time was passing; it was one o'clock, and yet the 1st Corps had not arrived; there was not even any news of it, but it could no longer be kept further away. The Marshal did not hesitate to engage in action; the English were visibly reinforcing their positions, but their numerical superiority did not worry him. He believed that the sound of his cannon would hasten the arrival of the 1st Corps, and he charged the enemy. Guilleminot's division launched itself into the Bossu woods, where it encountered strong resistance. However, by three o'clock, it controlled the woods and threatened the rear of Quatre-Bras. Bachelu's division joined the enemy head-on on the road itself, and Foy's division attacked the extreme left flank of the English. Everywhere, the resistance was fierce, but everywhere the attack was impetuous. Pirée's division, although protected by our artillery, launched a charge that was unsuccessful.

Shortly before three o'clock, General Kellermann, at the head of two cuirassier regiments, arrived to share in our efforts; He rested only as long as necessary to allow the horses to catch their breath, then executed a brilliant charge that met with complete success. He cut several squares of Scottish infantry to pieces, routed others, captured a flag, and, despite the fiercest resistance, managed to establish himself at Quatre-Bras. If the 1st Corps, or even just one of its divisions, had arrived at that moment, the day would have been most glorious for our forces; infantry troops were needed to hold the conquest our cavalry had just made, and the Marshal had none available, as the three divisions of the 2nd Corps were fully engaged.

General Kellermann had been holding Quatre-Bras for half an hour when the English infantry, recovering from their initial shock, slipped into the houses, barns, and stables of the village, raining a hail of bullets down on our cavalrymen. Soon after, the enemy uncovered a battery that brought death to the ranks of our brave men, who could not long withstand a sustained attack. We had to retreat.

The general was unhorsed, and disorder broke out in his recently victorious troops. The marshal, blocking the road, tried to stop them but could not. General Kellermann was also returning, but clinging by each hand to the bits of two galloping cuirassier horses.

It was at this moment that Colonel Laurent, sent from Imperial Headquarters, informed the Marshal that the 1st Corps, by order of the Emperor, which he had transmitted to General d'Erlon, had crossed the Brussels road instead of following it and was moving in the direction of Saint-Armand. General d'Elcambre, Chief of Staff of this corps, arrived shortly afterward to announce the movement that was taking place.

The enemy then had 50,000 men at Quatre-Bras. They were making progress against us; but the Marshal, like a true captain, judging success impossible, rallied his heavily engaged troops and made good preparations to defend themselves at the position of Frasnes, to wait out nightfall and spend the night there, which the enemy, despite having three times their forces, could not prevent.

It is clear that with 17,000 men, plus Kellermann's cuirassier brigade, the Marshal had forced victory to side with him. Consider what he would have done had the first corps arrived! The new assignment given to this troop, in which he had no part, changed everything. Fortunately, Marshal Ney possessed to a high degree the two primary qualities of a warrior: presence of mind in danger and patience in adversity. He knew how to put them to good use in this difficult situation. This day cost us approximately 3,000 men killed or wounded, but the enemy lost more than 9,000 according to their own reports.

The Marshal displayed such firmness throughout the day that the English did not dare send the slightest detachment to support the Prussians, who, however, had only agreed to the Battle of Fleurus on the assurance that they would be backed up.

The Emperor, having encountered great resistance everywhere, had drawn the 1st Corps to him, as we have seen, in the direction of Saint-Armand. The appearance of this corps behind the French engaged at Ligny caused a momentary fear that it might be the enemy. The error was soon recognized; but precious time was lost, and the troops sent to meet it were recalled.

The enemy offered no more fierce resistance; Ligny was taken and retaken several times. However, with victory declared for the Emperor at Fleurus, and the Prussians beginning to slow down on other fronts, the 1st Corps was sent back to its initial destination without having been of any use whatsoever. General d'Erlon personally came at 9:00 PM to report on his day to the Marshal and receive his orders. This corps established its bivouacs behind Frasnes and still had part of the night to march to regroup.

It is now clear that, through no fault of Count d'Erlon, and even less so of Marshal Ney, the 1st Corps had not been of any use to the Emperor, and that its absence from Frasnes resulted in the loss of a day that could have yielded very significant results.

It is unnecessary to demonstrate through further reasoning that the movement of the 1st Corps from left to right and right to left, for which the Marshal was so unjustly blamed, was not his doing; he needed these troops too much to have ceded them without orders from above. The change of direction of this corps was made only on an order emanating directly from the Emperor. What could the Marshal have done? He only learned of this movement after it had already been carried out, and besides, had he been informed of it in advance, he would have been careful not to oppose it since the Emperor had ordered it.

The Marshal was joined at the end of that day by Mr. Devaux, one of his aides-de-camp.

On June 17, early in the morning, the Marshal ordered the troops under his command to take up arms. He himself was at the outposts from daybreak. The enemy had not left their positions from the previous day; but it could be judged that they were making a movement backwards.

The Marshal had received no news from the Emperor. It was only around 9 o'clock that the reconnaissance missions sent earlier that morning arrived to announce that he was marching with his army on the Namur road at Quatre-Bras. The Emperor indeed arrived at 10 o'clock at the Marshal's position, who, upon joining him, received orders to support the vanguard cavalry on the Brussels road. The troops of the 1st Corps formed the head of the column; having passed Quatre-Bras, they pursued the enemy.

It is not true that the Emperor expressed any displeasure to Marshal Ney; nor is it true that his troops were still in their bivouacs when he appeared, for they had been under arms since daybreak. The 1st Corps had already passed Frasnes and resumed its battle formation.

At the small town of Gennapes, there were a few cavalry skirmishes which did not slow our advance.

At six o'clock in the evening, the Marshal arrived on the field in front of the village of Planchenoit. He ordered his troops to draw up for battle as they emerged, for the enemy had halted on the heights overlooking the Soignes Forest, where they had established batteries that were inflicting significant losses on us.

The Emperor, arriving soon after, gave the order to advance, but we did not move. We saw the enemy deploy and show that they were awaiting battle, their right flank supported by the woods and the castle of Hougmont, their center straddling the main road, protected by a farmhouse, surrounded by hedges that they had crenellated. The left flank extended towards the village of Mont-Saint-Jean.

The Emperor withdrew the troops, and they took up positions for the night. The imperial headquarters was established at the Caillou farm, in the hamlet of Maison-le-Roi. The Marshal was in a house near the Emperor, with whom he dined and conferred for part of the evening.

Torrential rain fell throughout the night.

On the 18th, around eight o'clock in the morning, a general order appeared, signed by the Duke of Dalmatia, Major General, indicating what needed to be done to prepare for the battle that was about to take place; it was, in a way, the order to stand at attention for the one who would soon advance to the front line.

The weather had cleared, and the sun was beginning to dry the flooded lands, swollen by the night's rains.

Around eleven o'clock, the 2nd Corps took up position; one division, its right flank supported by the Brussels road, and a second division, its left flank supported by the Hougmont woods, both in two lines. The third division was in reserve, also in two lines, to the rear. The light cavalry division provided reconnaissance on the extreme left flank.

The 1st Corps also took up position, its right-hand division facing the British left flank, supported by the village of Frischermont. The second division followed, as did the third, whose left flank was supported by the Brussels road. The fourth division was in reserve, to the rear. The light cavalry, under the command of General Jacquinot, provided reconnaissance on the extreme right flank. The artillery was positioned in front of each division.

A battery of 60 cannons, manned by the Guard gunners, was positioned within range of the enemy, its left flank anchored to the road.

The 6th Corps, commanded by Count Lobau, was in reserve behind the 2nd Corps, its right flank anchored to the road.

All the cavalry reserves, including the Guard regiments, were massed in front of the village of Planchenoit, their left flank anchored to the main road.

The Guard infantry was also in reserve, positioned alongside the cavalry reserves, on both sides of the Brussels road. The Emperor was on a high rise to the left of the road, from where he could see the entire terrain where the fate of France would be decided.

To the left of the road, the terrain sloped gently down to the foot of the enemy position. On the right, on the contrary, it rose up and formed a kind of large plateau that broke only within cannon range of the English, so that on the front of the 1st Corps, the two armies were separated only by an unobstructed wall.

Around noon, a third aide-de-camp, the Marshal's horses and war equipment, arrived fortunately.

At one o'clock, the signal for the attack was given by the main battery of the Guard; soon after, the engagement became general.

General d'Erlon directed the attack on the extreme right, the Marshal commanded the attack on the center under the fire of the main battery, and General Reille attacked the woods and the Château d'Hougmont.

Around three o'clock, the enemy, despite the fiercest resistance, was forced to yield to the Marshal's efforts and clear its center. But at the same time as he left the high ground to the left of the road, he executed a cavalry charge on the right, which threw a section of the 1st Corps into disarray.

To support this charge, he advanced a battery at La Congreve, which fired over three hundred rockets at us. These rockets initially astonished us, then amused us without causing us any harm.

The same could not be said of the two regiments of English dragoons, which rushed forward and fell upon one of the divisions of the 1st Corps. Frightened, the division broke into disarray and was soon confused into a shapeless mass, unable to fire a single shot. Everything was in chaos, but they soon managed to restore its battle formation. A reserve battery of cannons, believing itself sufficiently protected by this division, became so disorganized that not a single gunner or squire was to be seen. But these two regiments, raging like a swarm of locusts, finally halted in front of our cavalry reserves. Soon the scene changed; the victors were repelled, routed, cut down, or captured; not one of them could rejoin the English army.

It was a little later that the cannon fire was heard on our right flank behind the village of Planchenoit; the Emperor soon learned that it was a Prussian corps, escaping General Grouchy's pursuit, but he concealed this troublesome movement. This corps, having recognized the British left flank, had emerged on our extreme right and was extending to its left in the direction of Charleroi.

Bulow, who commanded it, was making progress, and his cannon was already sweeping the road behind the village, where the general headquarters was established, which the service battalion was defending as best it could.

The 6th Corps, along with several cavalry regiments, was sent to oppose the Prussian advance, as they were maneuvering to cut our lines of communication.

From then on, all the non-combatants, as well as our numerous wounded who were retreating, headed, veering slightly off the road, towards Charleroi. As our batteries, which had only meager supplies, burned through their ammunition, they left the battlefield and followed the same direction: this formed a long column and already resembled a retreat.

It was at this moment that the Marshal, judging the importance of occupying the central position abandoned by the enemy, and having no infantry at his disposal, requested a cavalry brigade. This troop executed its movement at a trot; but it is unknown by what sudden impulse it was followed by all the reserves, including those of the Guard, who, as is well known, never obeyed anyone but their own officers, or the orders of the Emperor, who was sparing their attention.

All this cavalry, numbering 15,000 horses, crowded together without order and hindered one another; the first regiments on the summit of the position occupied by the enemy; the others on the slope of the plateau.

A few fairly successful charges were executed, but the most advanced soon came under direct and flanking fire from the English infantry, which had established itself, without perfect order, against the Soignes forest, in order to take shelter from the deadly blows of our artillery.

It was then learned that this spontaneous movement of our cavalry had occurred because the reserves, positioned more than half a league from the battlefield, unable to properly assess what was happening there, had nevertheless seen the enemy abandon their position. He was believed to be in retreat; this rumor spread, and the advance of the brigade ordered by the Marshal seemed to confirm it. There was danger and glory to be gained by pursuing this advance, a move for which the Marshal was accused. But this advance was carried out under the Emperor's very eyes; he could have stopped it, but he did not.

The enemy had only made a simple retreat to avoid our attacks. The English infantry had, in fact, been driven back to the Forest of Soignes, and one had to be on the very ground they had just left to know and be able to judge the great order they had maintained. The crenelated farmhouse that protected its center resisted all our efforts; more than two thousand of our men had been killed there trying to take it. The left flank attack had failed to capture Hougmont Castle, even though the entire 2nd Corps had been drawn there in succession. The right flank attack had made no progress, and Count d'Erlon was too preoccupied on his front and right flank, especially since Bulow's arrival, to be able to send new troops to the Marshal or provide him with assistance.

General Durutte's infantry division, the 1st Corps, almost single-handedly bore the brunt of the attack on the center, the most significant of the assault, and was holding its ground with the greatest effort, when the Marshal requested cavalry support to fill the ever-widening gap between the 1st and 2nd Corps.

The Prussian cannon fire, which could be heard behind us, continued to worry us. At once, to dispel this unsettling impression, the Emperor sent his aides-de-camp with orders to spread the word along the entire line that this cannon belonged to Grouchy.

It was six o'clock, and the Emperor simultaneously ordered the renewed attack on the center, which had slowed down; but fresh infantry was needed to restart it, and the Marshal no longer had any at his disposal. Half the soldiers who had begun the battle were either dead or wounded; the other half, exhausted, were running out of ammunition. The Marshal informed the Emperor through his first aide-de-camp, requesting reinforcements.

The Emperor replied: "Where do you expect me to get them? Or make them myself?" Prince Jerome and General Drouot overheard this response; it was relayed, unchanged, to the Marshal, who then realized that the battle was far from won.

However, a final effort finally brought us into possession of the crenellated farmhouse that protected the enemy's center; it had cost us dearly for the short time we were able to hold it.

Between seven and eight o'clock in the evening, the right wing of the Prussian corps, together with the left wing of the English, forced our extreme right flank and drove it back towards the center, simultaneously threatening the rear of the 6th Corps.

This audacious advance prompted the Emperor to send four battalions of the Guard to Marshal Ney, with which he somewhat slowed the enemy's advance. This troop paid with their lives for the boldness of a defense that had now become impossible. Other Guard troops also rushed forward in succession to support the first battalions, but it was too late; everything was in vain. The enemy, six times our number and emboldened by their success, soon advanced without hindrance. Night was falling, disorder broke out in our ranks, and all our troops were forced and swept away. The Guard itself could not resist; it followed the tide, and the road was covered with fleeing soldiers.

The enemy recaptured the crenellated farm and, having re-established batteries on the plateau they had abandoned that morning and unleashed their cavalry, compounded our disaster. The Emperor was caught up in this dreadful chaos; the rout was complete. Marshal Ney, who had lost five horses under him on that fateful day, was the last to leave this field of carnage, on foot, at the head of the remnants of the four battalions of the Guard. An officer of the Chasseurs à Cheval of the Guard lent him his own horse, with which he was able to reach the road and go to Marchiennes-au-Point. There he found his carriage and returned to Paris, where the Emperor had arrived twenty-four hours before him.

Such is the true account of the disastrous Waterloo campaign, as it pertains to Marshal Ney: may it dispel the false insinuations spread about one of the bravest warriors of our century, who at Waterloo (whatever has been said) was what he had always been throughout his glorious career: what he had been at Hohenlinden, Elchingen, Guttstads, Friedland, in Portugal, and during his memorable Russian campaign where he displayed such energy and great skill. The courageous men who survived the misery and cold of that time owe him, along with the lives he saved, the honor of having seen their homeland again and returned to their homes! May this document, drawn up after fourteen years by an impartial witness, prove to those who read it that sooner or later the truth will come out, and vindicate the accusations that ignorance or bad faith seek to endorse.

Paris, July 20, 1829, Colonel Heymes